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Abstract
This study considers public education policy and its impact on growth and wel-
fare across generations. In particular, the study compares two scal perspectives|
tax nance and debt nance|and shows that in a competitive equilibrium context,
the growth and utility in the debt-nance case could be higher than those in the
tax-nance case in the long run. However, the result is reversed when the policy
is shaped by politics. Voters choose debt nance, despite its worse performance, in
each period because a current generation can pass the cost of debt repayment to
future generations.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers the political determinants of scal policy and its impact on growth
and welfare across generations, particularly related to public education expenditures,
which work as both an intergenerational transfer from parents to children and an engine
of economic growth. Parents with an altruistic concern for their children are likely to
support public education at the cost of a tax burden because they can benet from highly
educated children. However, when the government has access to debt nance, parents
may prefer debt to taxes because debt enables the parents to shift the scal burden to
future generations.
The discussion above leads to the following questions: how do debt and tax nance
dier in terms of growth and welfare across generations, and which scal stance is adopted
via voting. To consider these questions, this study presents a three-period overlapping-
generations model with physical and human capital accumulation (see, e.g., Lambrecht,
Michel, and Vidal, 2005; Kunze, 2014). Parents care about their children's human capital.
Public education spending and parental human capital are inputs in the process of human
capital formation. Government spending is nanced by tax on labor income as well as
public bond issues if the government has access to debt nance.
Within this framework, this study rst investigates an economic equilibrium where
scal policy is exogenously given. In particular, we assume a xed education expenditure-
GDP ratio, and compare the case of nancing solely through a labor income tax to the
case of nancing through tax and public bond issues. The analysis shows that under a
certain condition, the growth and utility in the debt-nance case are higher than those
in the tax-nance case in the long run. Debt nancing passes a part of the burden
of the expenditure to future generations. However, the costs for future generations are
outweighed by the benets they will enjoy through human capital accumulation. The
result suggests that the debt-nanced public education spending may be desirable from
the perspective of growth and utility.
The result above depends critically on the assumption of a xed education expenditure-
GDP ratio. In the real world, however, the expenditure is determined through political
competition. To demonstrate endogenous determinants of the expenditure and their im-
pacts, we present the politics of scal policy formation. In each period, parents are
assumed to participate in voting, and the government chooses scal policy to maximize
their utility. Given this process, we provide a characterization of political equilibrium in
both the tax- and debt-nance cases, and compare them in terms of growth rates. We nd
that the growth rate in the debt-nance case is lower than that in the tax-nance case.
The debt overrides capital accumulation and adds the cost of debt repayment, reducing
the government's available resources, and thus decreases public education expenditure as
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an engine of economic growth. The peculiar negative impact on the expenditure in the
debt-nance case is the key to the result.
We undertake further analysis of scal policy formation by introducing voting on scal
rules. Specically, we assume that in each period, the government proposes two scal
rules, the tax-nance and the debt-nance rules, and one is chosen based on maximizing
parental utility. Then, for a given scal rule, the parents vote on scal policy. In this
setting, we show that debt nance is chosen in each period because parents aiming to
maximize their utility do not care about debt repayment costs for future generations.
Following the same reasoning, every generation nds it optimal to choose debt nancing.
However, this choice is not optimal in the long run. As described above, debt reduces
public education expenditures and thus retards human capital formation. Because of this
negative eect, future generations are worse o than in the tax-nance case. The result
suggests that the current generation's myopic choice in scal rules results in loss of welfare
for future generations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We rst present a literature survey
in Subsection 1.1. Thereafter, Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the
economic equilibrium and Section 4 describes the political equilibrium and investigates
the choice of scal rules and the impact on growth and welfare. Section 5 oers concluding
remarks.
1.1 Literature Review
Our study is related to research into public education and economic growth in the pres-
ence of parental altruism toward children. Examples include studies from Glomm and
Kaganovich (2003, 2008) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1992, 2001, 2003) based in the
competitive equilibrium context assuming that the central government can control policy
processes and outcomes across periods. Under this assumption, these researchers investi-
gate how changes in educational policy aect growth and welfare across generations and
the optimal policy in terms of long-term growth and/or welfare.
Several studies attempted to relax the assumption by introducing voting into the
process of policymaking. These studies tend to focus on factors aecting policymaking,
such as aging (Zhang, Zhang, and Lee, 2003; Gradstein and Kaganovich, 2004; Kunze,
2014), inequality (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993), expectations of future policy (Glomm
and Ravikumar, 1995), private education as an alternative to public education (Gradstein
and Justman, 1996), social cohesion (Gradstein and Justman, 2002), and social security
(Kemnitz, 2000; Poutvaara, 2006; Soares, 2006; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2012; Iturbe-
Ormaetxe and Valera, 2012; Kaganovich and Meier, 2012; Naito, 2012; Lancia and Russo,
2015; Ono, 2015; Ono and Uchida, 2015). However, all of these studies assume nancing
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from taxes where the government budget constraint is balanced each period. In other
words, debt nancing of public education is abstracted away from their analyses.
Zhang (2003) and Greiner (2008) analyzed debt nancing. Zhang (2003) demonstrates
the optimal policy for public education when the government can issue public bonds, and
Greiner (2008) investigates the impact of debt-nanced public education on economic
growth. These studies are thus based in the competitive equilibrium context, and say
nothing about the political determinants of debt nance policy. Our study instead demon-
strates endogenous determinants of debt-nanced public education expenditures and its
impact on growth and welfare across generations. With this analysis, we can evaluate the
relative performance of the two scal stances and explain why debt nance has lingered
through the past decades in many developed countries despite its poorer performance.
2 Model
The discrete time economy starts at period 0 and consists of overlapping generations.
Individuals are identical within a generation, and live for three periods: youth, middle,
and elderly ages. Each middle-aged individual gives birth to 1 + n children. The middle-
aged population for the period t is Nt, and the population grows at a constant rate of
n(>  1) : Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals display the following economic behavior over their life cycles. During youth,
individuals make no economic decisions and receive public education nanced by the gov-
ernment. In middle age, individuals work, receive market wages, and make tax payments.
They use after-tax income for consumption and savings. Individuals retire in their elderly
years and receive and consume returns from savings.
Consider an individual born in period t  1. In period t, the individual is middle aged
and endowed with ht units of human capital. The individual supplies them inelastically
in the labor market, and obtains labor income wtht, where wt is the wage rate per ecient
unit of labor in period t. After paying tax twtht, where t 2 (0; 1) is the period t income
tax rate, the individual distributes the after-tax income between consumption ct and
savings invested in physical capital st. Therefore, the period t budget constraint for the
middle age becomes:
ct + st  (1  t)wtht:
The period t+ 1 budget constraint in the elderly age is
dt+1  Rt+1st;
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where dt+1 is consumption, Rt+1(> 0) is the gross return from investment in capital, and
Rt+1st is the return from savings.
Period t middle-aged individuals care about their children's income; wt+1ht+1. The
children's human capital in period t + 1, ht+1, is a function of government spending on
public education, xt, and the parent's human capital, ht. In particular, ht+1 is formulated
by the following equation:
ht+1 = D (xt)
 (ht)
1  ;
whereD(> 0) is a scale factor, and  2 (0; 1) denotes the elasticity of education technology
with respect to public education spending.
We note that private investment in education may also contribute to human capital
formation. For example, parents' time (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1995, 2001, 2003; Glomm
and Kaganovich, 2008) or spending (Glomm, 2004; Lambrecht, Michel, and Vidal, 2005;
Kunze, 2014) devoted to education may complement public education. In the present
study, we abstract private education from the analysis to simplify the presentation of the
model and to focus on the eect of public education on growth and utility.
We assume that parents are altruistic toward their children and are concerned about
their income in middle age, wt+1ht+1. The preferences of an individual born in period
t  1 are specied by the following expected utility function of the logarithmic form:
Ut = ln ct +  ln dt+1 +  lnwt+1ht+1;
where  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor and (> 0) denotes the intergenerational degree of
altruism. We substitute the budget constraints and human capital production function
into the utility function to form the following unconstrained maximization problem:
max
fstg
ln [(1  t)wtht   st] +  lnRt+1st +  lnwt+1D (xt) (ht)1  :
By solving the problem, we obtain the following savings and consumption functions:
st =

1 + 
 (1  t)wtht; (1)
ct =
1
1 + 
 (1  t)wtht and dt+1 = Rt+1
1 + 
 (1  t)wtht: (2)
2.2 Firms
Each period contains a continuum of identical rms that are perfectly competitive prot
maximizers. According to Cobb{Douglas technology, they produce a nal good Yt using
two inputs, aggregate physical capital Kt and aggregate human capital Ht  Ntht. The
aggregate output is given by:
Yt = A (Kt)
 (Ht)
1  ,
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where A(> 0) is a scale parameter and  2 (0; 1) denotes the capital share.
Let kt  Kt=Ht denote the ratio of physical to human capital. The rst-order condi-
tions for prot maximization with respect to Ht and Kt are:
wt = (1  )A (kt) ; and t = A (kt) 1 ; (3)
where wt and t are labor wages and the rental price of capital, respectively. The con-
ditions state that rms hire human and physical capital until the marginal products are
equal to the factor prices.
2.3 Government Budget Constraint
Public education expenditures are nanced by both tax on labor income and public bond
issues. Let Bt denote the aggregate inherited debt. A government budget constraint in
period t is:
Bt+1 + twthtNt = Nt+1xt +RtBt;
where Bt+1 is newly issued public bonds, twthtNt is the aggregate labor income tax
revenue, Nt+1xt is the aggregate expenditure for public education, and RtBt is debt re-
payment. We assume a one-period debt structure to derive analytical solutions from the
model, and assume that the government in each period is committed to not repudiating
the debt.
By dividing both sides of the above expression, we obtain a per-capita from of the
constraint:
(1 + n)b^t+1 + twtht = (1 + n)xt +Rtb^t; (4)
where b^t  Bt=Nt is the per-capita public debt. We use the notation b^t rather than bt
to distinguish the per-capita public debt, b^t  Bt=Nt; from the public debt per human
capital, bt  Bt=Ht; which we introduce in the next section.
In an alternative case, the government imposes a rule of keeping a balanced budget in
each period. That is, the government satises the following constraint:
0w0h0 = (1 + n)x0 +R0b^0;
twtht = (1 + n)xt; t  1: (5)
This rule is stricter than the rule where debt cannot increase across periods (see, e.g., Azz-
imonti, Battaglini, and Coate, 2010). Our study thus adopts a stricter rule to demonstrate
the impact of debt nancing public expenditure simply.
3 Economic Equilibrium
Public bonds are traded in a domestic capital market. The market clearing condition
for capital is Bt+1 + Kt+1 = Ntst, which expresses the equality of total savings by the
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middle-aged population in period t; Ntst, to sum of the stocks of aggregate public debt
and aggregate physical capital at the beginning of period t + 1, Bt+1 + Kt+1. Using
kt+1  Kt+1=Ht+1, ht+1 = Ht+1=Nt+1, and the savings function in (1), we can rewrite the
condition as:
(1 + n) 

kt+1ht+1 + b^t+1

=

1 + 
 (1  t)wtht: (6)
The following denes the economic equilibrium in the present model.
Denition 1. Given a sequence of policies, ft; xtg1t=0, an economic equilibrium is a se-
quence of allocations
n
ct; dt; st; kt+1; b^t+1; ht+1
o1
t=0
and prices ft; wt; Rtg1t=0 with the
initial conditions k0(> 0); b^0( 0) and h0(> 0) such that (i) given (wt; Rt+1; t; xt) ;
 
cyt ; c
o
t+1; st

solves the utility maximization problem; (ii) given (wt; t), kt solves a rm's prot
maximization problem; (iii) given

wt; ht; kt; b^t

;

t; xt; b^t+1

satises the govern-
ment budget constraint; (iv) t = Rt holds; and (v) the capital market clears:
(1 + n) 

kt+1ht+1 + b^t+1

= st.
In the following, we consider two cases: a "tax-nance" case where public education
expenditures are nanced solely through labor income tax, and a "debt-nance" case
where the expenditures are nanced by both labor income taxes and public bond issues.
We characterize an economic equilibrium for each case, and then compare the two cases
in terms of steady-state growth rates and utility. In particular, we identify the condition
where shifting from tax to debt nance improves steady-state growth and utility.
3.1 Tax-nance Economic Equilibrium
In the tax-nance case, the government budget constraint is given by (5). Note that here
we impose the following expenditure rule:
Nt+1xt
Yt
=
(1 + n)xt
A (kt)
 ht
= Xecon 2 (0; 1  ); (7)
where Xecon is a constant parameter. The rule indicates that the government xes the
ratio of public education spending to GDP at a constant rate. The upper limit of Xecon;
1   , implies that the government can use a part of labor income for public education
expenditures through taxation. We introduce this rule to compare the tax- and debt-
nance cases under the same expenditure structure.
Given Xecon, a tax rate is determined satisfying the constraint (5). Thus, the tax rate
under the expenditure rule in (7) is given by:(
0 =
Xecon
1  +

1   b^0k0h0 ;
t =
Xecon
1  for t  1:
(8)
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Substituting the tax rate and the human capital production function into the capital
market clearing condition in (6) leads to the following law of the motion of capital:8>><>>:
k1 =

1+

1 Xecon
1    1  
b^0
k0h0

(1 )
(1+n)D(Xecon1+n )
 (A (k0)
)
1 
;
kt+1 =

1+ (1 Xecon1  )(1 )
(1+n)D(Xecon1+n )
 (A (kt)
)
1 
for t  1
The expression suggests that there is a unique, stable, steady-state equilibrium described
by:
k = kjtax 
"

1+
 
1  Xecon
1 

(1  )
(1 + n)D
 
Xecon
1+n
 (A)1 
#1=f1 (1 )g
: (9)
The following proposition summarizes the results up to this point.
Proposition 1. Assume the expenditure rule in (7). There is a unique, stable steady-
state tax-nance economic equilibrium.
3.2 Debt-nance Economic Equilibrium
We next consider the debt-nance case, where the government budget constraint is given
by (4). We follow the expenditure rule in the tax nance case to compare the two cases
using the same expenditure structure. We also assume that the tax rate is constant across
periods,  = debt for all t, and that debt satises:
debt  Xecon
1  : (10)
The assumption in (10) indicates that the tax revenue is not sucient to nance public
education expenditures, and the government covers the revenue shortfall by issuing public
bonds.
Adopting the prot maximization conditions in (3), we can reformulate the government
budget constraint in the debt-nance case as:
(1 + n)b^t+1 + debt(1  )A (kt) ht = (1 + n)xt + A (kt) 1 b^t:
Let bt  b^t=ht = Bt=Ht denote public debt per human capital. The above expression is
thus rewritten as:
(1 + n)bt+1
ht+1
ht
+ debt(1  )A (kt) = XeconA (kt) + A (kt) 1 bt: (11)
Using the human capital production function, the government budget constraint in
(11) is reformulated as:
(1 + n)bt+1D

Xecon
1 + n
A (kt)


= [Xecon   debt(1  )]A (kt) + A (kt) 1 bt: (12)
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This is the rst key equation in the debt-nance economic equilibrium. The other key
equation is the capital market clearing condition, which can be derived by substituting
(12) into the capital market clearing condition in (6):
kt+1 =
1
(1 + n)D
 
Xecon
1+n




1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )  (Xecon   debt(1  ))

(A (kt)
)
1     (A (kt))1  bt
kt

:
(13)
Therefore, given an initial condition, k0 > 0 and b0  0, the sequence of physical capital
and public debt per human capital, fkt; btg, in a debt-nance economic equilibrium is
characterized by (12) and (13). The following proposition establishes the condition for
the existence and stability of a steady-state debt-nance economic equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Assume the expenditure rule in (7) and that the following conditions
hold:
debt(1  ) < Xecon < Xecon;
0 < debt  1  1 + 

 
1  ; and  <

1 + 2
;
where
Xecon  + 
1 + 
(1 debt)(1 )+debt(1 ) 2


1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )

1=2
:
There are two steady-state debt-nance economic equilibria with b > 0, denoted by
el and eh; where el (eh) is distinguished by a lower (higher) k: Then, el is a saddle,
and eh is a sink.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 illustrates an example phase diagram for the planner system (12) and (13).
The phase line denoted by KK is a set of points (k; b) for which there is no change in k
in the capital market clearing condition in (13). The phase line denoted by BB is a set
of points (k; b) for which there is no change in b in the government budget constraint in
(12). The vertical line at k = k^ indicates that nancial balance state varies around this
point, where k^ is dened by:
k^ 
"
A
(1 + n)D
 
Xecon
1+n
A

#1=(1 (1 ))
:
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Below (above) k = k^, the government budget has a negative (positive) debt in the steady
state. The two intersections in phase lines KK and BB correspond to the two steady-
state equilibria with positive debt, which are common in the literature (see, e.g., Azariadis,
1993; de la Croix and Michel, 2002).
Proposition 2 demonstrates the three conditions for the existence of multiple steady-
state equilibria with positive debt. The rst condition determines the range of Xecon for
the two steady-state equilibria with b > 0. In particular, the rst inequality condition,
debt(1 ) < Xecon implies that the government must nance part of the expenditure by
borrowing in the capital market. If the condition fails, tax revenue is sucient to cover
the expenditure, so the steady-state equilibrium would have a negative public debt, which
is out of scope for this study.
The second inequality condition, Xecon < Xecon ensures that the two steady-state
equilibria exist. If the condition fails, the government must nance large expenditures
for public education by issuing public bonds. However, this induces high debt repayment
burdens on households, which creates a negative income eect on saving and thus implies
a low debt level that clears the capital market. Therefore, given k, the government budget
constraint is satised for a high level of public debt, while the capital market clears for a
low level of public debt. That is, there is no debt level that satises both the government
budget constraint and the capital market clearing condition if Xecon is above the critical
level.
The second condition requires a tax rate below the critical value of 1  1+

 
1  . This
condition determines the upper bound of Xecon given in the rst condition. The third
condition ensures that the tax rate in the second condition is non-empty.
3.3 Growth and Utility in the Steady States
The previous two subsections describe the steady-state equilibrium for the tax- and debt-
nance cases. To evaluate their relative performance, we here compare the two cases in
terms of growth rate and utility in the steady state, and show the results.
Proposition 3. (i) The steady-state growth rate in the debt-nance economic equi-
librium is higher than that in the tax-nance economic equilibrium if Xecon >
(1  ) (1  (1 + )=(1  )); (ii) the steady-state utility in the debt-nance eco-
nomic equilibrium is higher than that in the tax-nance economic equilibrium if
Xecon > (1  ) (1  (1 + )=(1  )) and  > (1  )=.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
To compare the two cases, we here denote by h0=hjtax and U jtax the steady-state
growth rate and utility for the tax-nance case, respectively. zjtax and ht;tax denote the
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steady-state level of z(= k; b) and the period-t human capital for the tax-nance case,
respectively. The corresponding notations are h0=hjdebt, U jdebt, zjdebt and ht;debt for the
debt-nance case. The variable h0 in the expressions h0=hjtax and h0=hjdebt denotes the
next-period h.
To understand the results in Proposition 3, let us rst compare the steady-state growth
rates. Given the expenditure rule in (7), the public education expenditures are x =
XeconA(k)
h=(1+n) for both cases. We substitute this expression into the human capital
production function, h0 = D(x)(h)1 , to obtain:
h0
h
= D

Xecon
1 + n
A(k)

: (14)
This is common for both cases.
Substituting the steady-state level of capital in (9) into (14) yields the steady-state
growth rate in the tax-nance economic equilibrium:
h0
h

tax
=

D

Xecon
1 + n
A
 1 1 (1 )
| {z }
(#1)

"

1+
((1  ) Xecon)A
1 + n
# 
1 (1 )
| {z }
(#2)
: (15)
In the debt-nance case, the steady-state capital level is higher than k^, as illustrated in
Figure 1. Therefore, the growth rate in the debt-nance economic equilibrium satises
h0=hjdebt >

XeconA(k^)
=(1 + n)

; that is,
h0
h

debt
>

D

Xecon
1 + n
A
 1 1 (1 )
| {z }
(#1)


A
1 + n
 
1 (1 )
| {z }
(#3)
: (16)
The expressions in (15) and (16) suggest that the ratio of public education expenditure
to GDP, represented by Xecon; aects the steady-state growth rates in several ways. First,
a higher expenditure ratio increases the growth rate for both cases, as shown by the term
(#1) in (15) and (16). However, the tax-nance case also contains a negative eect of
public education expenditures as shown by the term (#2) in (15). A higher ratio implies a
larger household tax burden. This discourages savings and capital accumulation, thereby
reducing public education expenditures and economic growth in the next period. This
negative eect does not appear in the debt-nance case, as demonstrated by the term
(#3) in (16) because the public bond issues in the debt-nance case compensates for
the tax burden. Therefore, the growth rate in the debt-nance case is higher than that
in the tax-nance case if the term (#3) outweighs the term (#2); that is, if Xecon >
(1  ) (1  (1 + )=(1  )).
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Next, we compare the steady-state utility in both cases. Given k and b in the steady
state, U jtax and U jdebt are computed as follows:
U jtax = (1 + ) ln ((1  ) Xecon)A (kjtax) + f (  1) + g ln kjtax
+  ln
Xecon
1 + n
A (kjtax) + (1 +  + ) lnht;tax + C0; (17)
U jdebt = (1 + ) ln

((1  ) Xecon)A (kjdebt) +

 A (kjtax) 1 + (1 + n)
h0
h

debt

 bjdebt

+ f (  1) + g ln kjdebt +  ln
Xecon
1 + n
A (kjdebt) + (1 +  + ) lnht;debt + C0;
(18)
where C0 includes constant terms. Appendix A.3 provides the derivation of (17) and (18)
and the denition of C0.
For both cases, the rst term represents disposable income, the second term includes
the rate of return from savings and the next generation's wage, the third term shows
the public education expenditures, and the fourth term summarizes the human capital
accumulation eect. By comparing (17) and (18), we nd that U jdebt > U jtax holds if
each term in Eq. (18) is larger than the corresponding term in Eq. (17).
After some calculation, we nd that (i) in the debt-nance case, the debt repayment
 A (kjtax) 1 bjdebt is equal to the debt issue revenue (1 + n)  (h0=hjdebt)  bjdebt in the
steady state, and (ii) if h0=hjdebt > h0=hjtax holds, then kjdebt > kjtax holds; that is, a
higher growth rate results in higher steady-state capital. These observations suggest that
the rst, second, third, and fourth terms in Eq. (18) are larger than those in Eq. (17) if
h0=hjdebt > h0=hjtax and  (  1) +  > 0. Therefore, the debt-nance case attains a
higher steady-state utility if Xecon > (1 ) (1  (1 + )=(1  )) and  > (1 )=.
The result in Proposition 3 suggests that under the condition Xecon, debt-nanced
spending is desirable in terms of steady-state growth and utility. In fact, debt nancing
enables us to pass a part of the burden of the expenditure to the future generations who
benet from it through human capital accumulation. However, in the real world, the
expenditure-GDP ratio does not necessarily satisfy the condition Xecon in Proposition 3
because it is determined through political competition inuenced by economic conditions
such as physical and human capital accumulation. Therefore, the following questions
arise: in what condition will voters support debt nance, and which nancing system
is desirable when scal policy is endogenous? We address these questions in the next
section.
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4 Political Equilibrium
This section demonstrates the politics of scal policy formation for the tax- and debt-
nance cases. In each period, the young, the middle-aged, and the elderly can participate
in voting. However, the young and the elderly are indierent between any two policies
because they owe no burden and obtain no benet. Therefore, the government's aim in
each period is to maximize the utility of the middle-aged, given by:
Vt = (1+) ln f(1  )A (kt)   twthtg+f(  1) + g ln kt+1+ lnxt+(1 ) lnht+C0:
(19)
The term f(1  )A (kt)   twthtg shows the after-tax income, and thus represents utility
from consumption. The second term includes the utility from the return on savings,
(   1) ln kt+1; and the utility from the next generation's wage income,  ln kt+1: The
third and fourth terms correspond to the utility from the next generation's human capital,
ht+1.
Given the state variables kt; ht, and b^t, the period t government chooses scal policy to
maximize Vt subject to the capital-market-clearing condition and the government budget
constraint. Formally, Denition 2 describes the political equilibrium in this framework.
Denition 2. A political equilibrium is a sequence of policies ft; xtg1t=0, allocationsn
ct; dt; st; kt+1; b^t+1; ht+1
o1
t=0
, and prices ft; wt; Rtg1t=0 with the initial conditions
k0(> 0); h0(> 0) and b^0( 0) such that (i) the conditions in Denition 1 (Economic
Equilibrium) are satised; and (ii) in period t( 0), the government chooses xt and
t (or b^t+1) to maximize Vt subject to the capital market clearing condition and the
government budget constraint, given by kt; ht, and b^t:
In the following analysis, we rst characterize a political equilibrium in the tax-nance
case in Subsection 4.1 and that in the debt-nance case in Subsection 4.2. Then, in
Subsection 4.3, we compare the two cases in terms of government expenditure-GDP ratio,
the tax rate, and the steady-state growth rate. In Subsection 4.4, we demonstrate the
endogenous choice of the two scal rules and its long-term consequence in terms of utility.
4.1 Tax-nance Political Equilibrium
In the tax-nance case, (5) gives the government budget constraint. Substituting this into
Vt in (19) leads to:
Vt = (1+) ln (it   (1 + n)xt)+f(  1) + g ln kt+1+ lnxt+(1 ) lnht+C0; (20)
where it is dened by
it  (1  )A (kt) ht   A (kt) 1 b^t:
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The term (1 )A (kt) ht denotes labor income, and the term A (kt) 1 b^t denotes debt
repayment in period 0 only. Therefore, it represents the government's available resources
for its expenditures. Using the denition of it and the human capital formation function,
ht+1 = D (xt)
 (ht)
1  ; we can reformulate the capital-market-clearing condition in (6)
as:
(1 + n)kt+1D(xt)
(ht)
1  =

1 + 
(it   (1 + n)xt): (21)
The problem of the period t government is to maximize Vt in (20) subject to (21) given
kt; ht; and b^t:
The rst-order condition with respect to xt is:
(1 + n)
f1 + ( + )g
it   (1 + n)xt =
( + )(1  )
xt
;
where the left-hand side is the marginal cost of public education expenditure, and the
right-hand side is its marginal benet. The government chooses xt to balance the marginal
cost and benet, so xt is given by:
xt = X0  it; (22)
where
X0  ( + )(1  )
(1 + n) [1 + ( + ) f+ (1  )g] :
To understand the property of the policy function of xt, let us focus on the numerator of
X0; (+)(1 ). This term is decomposed as (+)(1 ) =  [ f(  1) + g+ ]
where the terms  f(  1) + g and  in the square brackets correspond to the coe-
cients of the second and third terms of Vt in (20), respectively. The term f(  1) + g
implies that an increase in public education expenditures reduces the physical to human
capital ratio, and this in turn increases the return on saving but decreases the children's
wage income. The term  suggests that public education expenditures enhance the chil-
dren's human capital formation and thus improves parents' utility. In sum, the net eect
of these terms is positive.
Substituting the policy function in (22) into the government budget constraint, we
obtain the corresponding tax rate:
t =

(1 + n)X0 + (1  (1 + n)X0) 1  b0k0 for t = 0:
(1 + n)X0 for t  1:
The term (1 + n)X0 indicates that an increase in education expenditures is nanced
by raising the tax rate. In addition, in the initial period, the government must further
increase the tax rate for debt repayment, as represented by the term 1(=(1  ))(b0=k0).
However, increasing budget pressure is partially oset by a reduction in public education
expenditures, as represented by the term ( 1)  (1 + n)X0  (=(1  ))  (b0=k0).
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We can use the policy functions of xt and t to reformulate the capital market clearing
condition in (6) as follows:
kt+1 =
(
~	K 

(1  )A (k0)   A (k0) 1 b0
	1 
for t = 0;
~	K  f(1  )A (kt)g1  for t  1;
where
~	K  
1 + 
 1  (1 + n)X0
(1 + n)D (X0)
 :
Given k0(> 0) and b0( 0); a sequence of fktg is uniquely determined to satisfy the
above condition. The condition for t  1, kt+1 = ~	K  f(1  )A (kt)g1  suggests
that the sequence stably converges to the unique steady state. The following proposition
summarizes the result established thus far.
Proposition 4. There is a unique, stable, steady-state tax-nanced political equilibrium
with kt > 0 for all t  0:
4.2 Debt-nance Political Equilibrium
In the debt-nance case, (4) gives the government budget constraint. Substituting this
into Vt in (19) leads to:
Vt = (1+) ln

it   (1 + n)xt + (1 + n)b^t+1

+f(  1) + g ln kt+1+ lnxt+(1 ) lnht+C0:
(23)
A main departure from the tax-nance case is that the term (1 + n)b^t+1 appears in the
debt-nance case. This term represents the positive income eect arising from public bond
issues that enable the government to shift the burden of the expenditure from the current
to future generations. Therefore, it produces a positive income eect on households.
The government's problem is to maximize Vt in (23) subject to the government budget
constraint in (4) and the capital-market-clearing condition in (6). To more conveniently
reformulate the problem, we substitute the government budget constraint and the human
capital formation function into the capital-market-clearing condition and obtain:
kt+1 =
1
(1 + n)D(xt)(ht)1 
 
1 + 

"
it   (1 + n)xt   (1 + n)b^t+1

#
: (24)
We substitute this into Vt in (23) and obtain:
Vt = (1 + ) ln
h
it   (1 + n)xt + (1 + n)b^t+1
i
+ f(  1) + g ln
"
it   (1 + n)xt   (1 + n)b^t+1

#
(25)
+ ( + )(1  ) ln xt + (1  )( + )(1  ) lnht + C1;
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where C1 includes the following constant terms:
C1  C0 + f(  1) + g ln 
(1 + ) (1 + n)D
:
The rst three terms in (25) are relevant in policymaking. The rst term represents the
utility of lifetime consumption. The second term shows the utility of the next generation's
wage income aected by physical capital accumulation. The third term includes the three
factors aected by public education: the utility of the return on savings, the utility of the
next generation's wage income, and the utility of the next generation's human capital.
The government's problem is to choose a pair of (xt; b^t+1) that maximizes Vt in (25).
Solving the problem yields the following policy functions.
Lemma 1. The policy functions of xt; b^t+1, and t in the debt-nance political equilib-
rium are
xt = X0  it;
b^t+1 = B0  it;
t = (1 + n) (X0  B0) + 
1    f1  (1 + n) (X0  B0)g 
bt
kt
;
where
B0  (1 + )    f(  1) + g
(1 + n) [1 + ( + ) f + (1  )g]
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The policy function of xt is identical to that in the tax-nance political equilibrium.
Public debt produces debt repayment costs, and thus reduces the government's available
resources it. However, it does not aect the fraction of the resources devoted to public
education expenditures.
The policy function of b^t+1 indicates that the two factors, (1 + )  and f(  1) + g,
are crucial to the government's state of nancial balance. The term (1 + )  corresponds
to the coecient of the rst term of Vt in (25). A greater weight on the utility of con-
sumption incentivizes the government to issue more public bonds to raise consumption
levels in the middle and elderly ages. The term f(  1) + g corresponds to the co-
ecient of the second term of Vt in (25). An increase in public bond issues overwhelms
physical capital accumulation, which in turn creates two opposing eects: an increase in
the interest rate represented by (   1); and a decrease in the children's wage income
represented by . Therefore, the government borrows in the capital market if the eect
of the rst term, (1 + ) , outweighs the eect of the second term, f(  1) + g.
The policy function of t suggests that it is aected by both public education ex-
penditures and public bond issues. The rst term (1 + n) (X0  B0) indicates that the
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government attempts to increase the tax rate to nance public education expenditures,
but can cut the tax rate and nance a part of the expenditure by issuing public bonds.
The second term shows the eect of debt repayment on the tax rate. In particular, the
term \1" of f1  (1 + n) (X0  B0)g indicates that the government raises the tax rate to
nance debt repayment. However, debt repayment pressure incentivizes the government
to cut public education expenditures and issue more public bonds. The former eect,
represented by (1+n)X0, works to decrease the tax rate, while the latter, represented by
(1 + n)B0, works in the opposite direction.
Having established the policy functions, we are now ready to demonstrate the accumu-
lation of physical and human capital and public debt. We substitute the policy functions
in Lemma 1 into the capital accumulation equation in (24), the government budget con-
straint in (4), and the human capital formation function given by ht+1 = D (xt)
 (ht)
1  ;
and obtain:
kt+1 = 	K 

(1  )A (kt)   A (kt) 1 bt
1 
;
bt+1 = 	B 

(1  )A (kt)   A (kt) 1 bt
1 
;
ht+1
ht
= D (X0)
  (1  )A (kt)   A (kt) 1 bt ;
where 	K and 	B are dened by:
	K 

n
1  (1 + n)X0   1+n B0
o
(1 + n)D (X0)
 (1 + )
and 	B  B0
D (X0)
 ;
respectively.
Given fk0; b0; h0g; a sequence of fkt; bt; htg in the debt-nance political equilibrium
contains the three equations above. We use these equations to obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 5. Assume the following conditions:
max

 f(1 + ) + (1  )(1  )g
(1  ) +  ;
(1 + )


<  <
 f(1 + ) + (1  )g

;
b0
k0
2

0;
1  


:
There is a unique, stable, steady-state debt-nance political equilibrium with kt+1 >
0; bt+1 > 0 and t 2 (0; 1) along the equilibrium path.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
A noteworthy feature of the result in Proposition 5 is that it provides a unique debt-
nance political equilibrium dierent from the result in the previous section demonstrating
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multiple economic equilibria: the two economies sharing the same structural parameter
values but dierent initial conditions may converge to dierent steady states. In other
words, the initial condition inuences long-term outcomes when scal policy is exogenous
(see, e.g., Azariadis, 1993; de la Croix and Michel, 2002). However, Proposition 5 shows
that the economy stably converges to a unique steady state for any initial condition.
Therefore, the initial condition is of little importance when scal policy is endogenous.
The  and b0=k0 assumptions in Proposition 5 outline the equilibrium path with k >
0; b > 0, and  2 (0; 1). To gain intuition for these assumptions, let us rst consider the
 assumption that represents the degree of altruism. First, suppose that  is above the
upper bound level given by  f(1 + ) + (1  )g =. Greater altruism encourages adults
to leave higher wage rates to their children, and will do so by decreasing public bond
issues and thus weakening its overpowering eect on capital accumulation. Given this
adult preference, the government nds it optimal to lend rather than to borrow in the
capital market. Therefore, we can avoid the case of government lending with the upper
bound of .
Next, consider the role of the lower bound of . When  is below the rst lower
bound given by  f(1 + ) + (1  )(1  )g = f(1  ) + g, the degree of altruism is
too low to incentivize the adults to provide higher levels of education, and they would
thus rather support more public bond issues to nance public education expenditures. In
this case, the government gains a surplus in revenue, and can thus refund it by subsidizing
households. We can rule out this possibility using the rst lower bound of . In addition,
more public bond issues increases the debt repayment cost, and thus results in a higher
tax rate of more than 100%. The second lower bound of  guarantees that the tax rate is
set below 100% for period t  1: The upper bound of b0=k0 guarantees the period 0 tax
rate below 100%.
4.3 Fiscal Rule Comparison
Public bond issues enable the current generation to pass costs on to future generations,
which in turn inuences the government's decisions representing the current middle. To
consider the impact of debt nance on policy, we here compare the aggregate expenditure-
GDP ratio and the tax rate in the debt-nance case with those in the tax-nance case,
and obtain the following result.
Proposition 6. Consider the aggregate expenditure-GDP ratio, Nt+1xt=Yt and the tax
rate, t. (i) For t = 0; N1x0=Y0jtax = N1x0=Y0jdebt : For t  1; Nt+1xt=Ytjtax >
Nt+1xt=Ytjdebt. (ii) For t = 0; 0jtax > 0jdebt. For t  1; tjtax 7 tjdebt if and only
if  7 (1  )=+ (1 + )2 =(1  ):
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
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[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 plots a numerical example of the evolution of the aggregate expenditure-
GDP ratio (in Panel (a)) and the tax rate (in Panel (b)) from period 0. The rst part
of Proposition 6 states that both cases have equal aggregate expenditure-GDP ratios
in the initial period, but they dier from period 1: To understand this result, recall the
policy function xt, which indicates that the government uses a fraction, X0, of its available
resources, it, for public education expenditures for both cases. The available resources are
equal in period 0 and given by i0 =

(1  )A (k0)   A (k0) 1 b0
	
h0 for both cases.
Therefore, the expenditure-GDP ratios are equal in period 0: However, they dier from
period 1: In the debt-nance case, the government must manage debt repayment, which
reduces its available resources. Therefore, the government attains a lower expenditure-
GDP ratio in the debt-nance case than in the tax-nance case.
The second part of Proposition 6 states that the tax rate in the tax-nance case
is higher than that in the debt-nance case in the initial period, but this relationship
reverses in the next period. In the debt-nance case, the government can implement
a tax cut nanced by public bond issues. Because of this tax-cut eect, the period 0
tax rate is lower in the debt-nance case than in the tax-nance case. However, from
period 1; the government has debt repayment costs in the debt-nance case, and must
then raise the tax rate. The second part of Proposition 6 shows that this tax-hike eect
is greater (less) than the tax-cut eect if  is below (above) the critical value given by
(1  )=+ (1 + )2 =(1  ).
To check the empirical plausibility of the  7 (1 )=+(1 + )2 =(1 ) condition,
we assume  = 0:3 and  = (0:997)30. The  = (0:997)30 assumption implies that each
generation lasts for 30 years, and a single-period discount factor is 0:997: In this setting,
the critical value of  is larger than the upper limit of  presented in Proposition 5.
Therefore, we can conclude that under empirically plausible parameter conditions, the
tax-hike eect outweighs the tax-cut eect, and this suggests that debt nance enables
the government to cut tax in the initial period, but results in a permanent tax hike from
the next period.
We next compare the steady-state growth rates for the two cases.
Proposition 7. The steady-state growth rate in the tax-nance political equilibrium is
higher than in the debt-nance political equilibrium; h0=hjtax > h0=hjdebt.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
[Figure 3 about here.]
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The steady-state growth rates in the tax-nance and debt-nance cases are given by:
h0
h

tax
= D 
"
X0


1 + 
 1  (1 + n)X0
(1 + n)D (X0)

 
1 (1 )
f(1  )Ag 11 (1 )
#
;
h0
h

debt
= D 
24X0 
1 + 
 1  (1 + n)X0  
1+n

B0
(1 + n)D (X0)

! 
1 (1 ) 
(1  )A  A	B
	K
 1
1 (1 )
35 ;
respectively. The equation h0=hjdebt suggests that there are two negative eects on the
growth rate peculiar to the debt-nance case. First, the cost of debt repayment reduces
the government's resources, which in turn decreases the public education expenditures as
an engine of economic growth. This eect is observed in the term  (1+n)B0=. Second,
the cost of debt repayment overwhelms capital accumulation and thus lowers the steady-
state level of capital, resulting in a higher interest rate that then further increases the
debt repayment cost. This eect is observed in the term A	B=	K . These two negative
eects from public debt result in a lower steady-state growth rate in the debt-nance case
than the tax-nance case. Figure 3 plots a numerical example of the evolution of the
growth rate.
4.4 Voting on Fiscal Rules
The analysis has thus far assumed a given scal rule, namely either a rule where the
government must balance its budget in each period (Subsection 4.1) or where the govern-
ment can borrow in the capital market (Subsection 4.2). However, in the real world, the
rule is also established through the political process; some countries and states adopt a
balanced-budget rule or something similar and others do not. For example, the US fed-
eral government has no balanced budget requirement in its Constitution (Poterba, 1995),
while some European countries have another form of the balanced budget rule, such as the
Maastricht Treaty criteria (Corsetti and Roubini, 1996). Therefore, a question naturally
arises: under what conditions will the government adopt debt nance rather than tax
nance?
To address this question, we consider the following vote on the rule. In each period,
the government proposes the two scal rules for a given set of state variables, k, b, and
h. One is chosen through voting with the aim of maximizing the value of the political
objective function, that is, the utility of the middle-aged. Second, for a given scal rule,
the middle-aged vote on scal policy. We solve the model by backward induction. We
have already demonstrated the vote on scal policy for a given rule in the previous two
subsections, and based on the result thus far, we can compare the utility of the middle-
aged under the tax-nance rule with that under the debt-nance rule for a given set of k,
b, and h, and obtain the following result.
19
Proposition 8. For a given k, b, and h, debt nance is chosen through voting.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
[Figure 4 and Table 1 about here.]
To understand the results in Proposition 8, consider period 0. Debt nance enables
the government to cut the tax rate (Proposition 6(ii)), which increases the disposable
income and thus lifetime consumption for the middle-aged in period-0, while the public
education expenditures remain equal in both cases (Proposition 6(i)). Therefore, the
period-0 middle-aged agents nd it optimal to choose debt rather than the tax nancing
to maximize utility. Because this result holds for any initial conditions of k > 0; b > 0,
and h > 0, successive generations also adopt debt nance.
Debt nance is optimal for the currently living generation because it decreases its
tax burden and shifts it to future generations. This implies that future generations are
worse o due to debt repayments. To examine the welfare implication of debt nance
across generations, we here compare the two scal rules in terms of utility. That is, we
plot the utility of successive generations from period 0 under the tax-nance rule and
that under the debt-nance rule in Figure 4, and summarize the result in Table 1. The
gure demonstrates that the period 0 generation is better o, while successive generations
are worse o when the tax-nance rule is replaced by the debt-nance rule. The result
suggests that the current generation's myopic choice of scal rule decreases welfare in
future generations.
5 Conclusion
This paper developed an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital
accumulation using public education and parental human capital as inputs in the process
of human capital formation. Public education spending is nanced through tax on labor
income in the tax-nance case, and by both tax and public bond issues in the debt-nance
case. Within this framework, we compared and evaluated the two scal choices in terms
of growth and utility, and showed that the debt-nance case could be superior to the
tax-nance case when the education expenditure-GDP ratio is xed.
Studies examining growth often assume a xed expenditure-GDP ratio, which enables
us to evaluate the eect of a change in the ratio on growth and welfare. However, in
the real world, the ratio is endogenous since the expenditure itself is determined by a
political process of voting by agents who recognize the impact of their actions. Given
this background, we presented endogenous policy formation and showed that the current
generation will prefer debt nance since it passes the debt repayment cost on to future
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generations. However, the debt repayment cost induces successive generations to cut the
expenditure, making them worse o than in the tax-nance case. Our result provides one
possible explanation for why debt nance continues predominantly in many developed
countries despite its expected worse performance.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We rst show the existence of two steady-state equilibria with b > 0. Recall that given an
initial condition (k0; b0), the equilibrium sequence of fkt; btg has the government budget
constraint in (12) and the capital-market-clearing condition in (13). In the steady state,
they are:
b =M 

(Xecon   debt(1  )) +  b
k

 (A(k))1  ;
k =M 


1 + 
(1  debt) (1  )  (Xecon   debt(1  ))   b
k

 (A(k))1  ;
where M is dened by:
M  1
(1 + n)D
 
Xecon
1+n
 :
These expressions are summarized as:
b
k
=
(Xecon   debt(1  )) +  bk

1+
(1  debt) (1  )  (Xecon   debt(1  ))   bk
;
or
f

b
k

=  

b
k
2
  x  b
k
+ (Xecon   debt(1  )) = 0; (26)
where f(0) = Xecon   debt(1   ) > 0 under the assumption in Proposition 2, and x is
dened by:
x  
1 + 
(1  debt) (1  )  (Xecon   debt(1  ))  :
Our task is to show that (26) has two distinct solutions with b=k > 0:
There are two distinct solutions for f(b=k) = 0 if x2   4(Xecon   debt(1   )) > 0;
i.e.,

1 + 
(1  debt) (1  )  (Xecon   debt(1  )) + 
2
> 4 ()2

1 + 
(1  debt) 1  

:
(27)
In addition, given that f(0) > 0, the two distinct solutions are both positive if f 0(0) < 0;
that is:
Xecon <

1 + 
(1  debt) (1  ) + debt(1  )  : (28)
Under the condition in (28), we have 
1+
(1  debt) (1 ) (Xecon debt(1 ))+ > 0:
(27) is reformulated as
Xecon <

1 + 
(1  debt) (1 )+debt(1 )+ 2


1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )

1=2
: (29)
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Therefore, there are two distinct solutions with b > 0 if (28) and (29) hold assuming
debt < 1   in (7) and debt(1  )  Xecon in (13). That is:
debt(1  )  Xecon < min

1  ; 
1 + 
(1  debt) (1  ) + debt(1  )  ;

1 + 
(1  debt) (1  ) + debt(1  ) +   2


1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )

1=2)
:
(30)
To determine the upper limit of Xecon in (30), we rst compare the rst two terms in
parentheses in (30), and nd:
1   > 
1 + 
(1  debt) (1  ) + debt(1  )  :
We next compare the last two terms and nd that the upper limit of Xecon is given by:
(i)

1 + 
(1  debt) (1  ) + debt(1  ))   if debt  1  1 + 


1  ;
(ii)

1 + 
(1  debt) (1  ) + debt(1  )) + 
  2


1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )

1=2
if debt < 1  1 + 


1  :
In case (i), the range of Xecon is given by:
debt(1  )  Xecon < 
1 + 
(1  debt) (1  ) + debt(1  )  :
The set of Xecon is nonempty if debt < 1  1+ 1  ; which contradicts the presumption in
case (i).
In case (ii), the range of Xecon is given by:
debt(1  )  Xecon
<

1 + 
(1  debt) (1  ) + debt(1  ) +   2


1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )

1=2
:
(31)
The set of Xecon is nonempty for any ; ; and debt because
debt(1  )  
1 + 
(1  debt) (1  ) + debt(1  ) +   2


1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )

1=2
, 0 
"

1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )

1=2
  1
#2
:
Therefore, there are two distinct solutions with b=k > 0 if (31) and 0 < debt  1  1+ 1 
hold. The range of debt is nonempty if  < =(1 + 2).
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Next, we show the stability of the two steady-state equilibria. We dierentiate (12)
and (13) with respect to k and b and evaluate them at the steady state to obtain:
dk =M 

2

1 + 
(1  )(1  )(1  )  1

dk  M2db; (32)
db =M1dk +M2db; (33)
where
1 

(Xecon   debt(1  ))(1  ) +  f(1  )  1g b
k

 (A(k))1   1
k
;
2    (A(k))1   1
k
: (34)
Let b = 	k(k) denote the phase line of k = 0 in Eq. (13), and b = 	b(k) the phase
line of b = 0 in Eq. (12). Using (32) and (33), we can compute the slope of 	k(k) and
	b(k) as follows:
@	k(k)
@k
=
1
M2


M

2

1 + 
(1  )(1  )(1  )  1

  1

; (35)
@	b(k)
@k
=
M1
1 M2 : (36)
The Jacobian matrix at any steady state of the planner system in (12) and (13) is
given by:
J =
"
M
n
2

1+
(1  )(1  )(1  )  1
o
 M2
M1 M2
#
:
The term M2 satises
0 < M2 < 1: (37)
The rst inequality condition holds because M > 0 and 2 > 0: To show that the second
inequality condition holds, rewrite M2 < 1 as:
M2 < 1, 1
(1 + n)D
 
Xecon
1+n
    (A(k))1   1
k
< 1
, k^ 
"
A
(1 + n)D
 
Xecon
1+n
A

#1=(1 (1 ))
< k:
The last condition, k^ < k, holds, as illustrated in Figure 1.
For any (k; b) >> 0; the trace and the determinant of J are
trJ =M 

2

1 + 
(1  )(1  )(1  )  1 + 2

;
detJ = (M2)
2  
1 + 
(1  )(1  )(1  ) 2 (0; 1);
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where detJ 2 (0; 1) holds because M2 2 (0; 1) holds from (37). Moreover,
  (trJ)2   4detJ
= (M)2 
"
2

1 + 
(1  )(1  )(1  )  1 + 2
2
  422 
1 + 
(1  )(1  )(1  )
#
= (M)2 
"
2

1 + 
(1  )(1  )(1  )  1   2
2
  421
#
:
Appendix A.2 shows that 1 < 0 if the condition in Proposition 2 applies. Therefore,
 > 0 holds and thus J has two distinct eigenvalues at each steady state if the condition
in Proposition 2 holds.
We derive the eigenvalues of J by solving the following equation:
p() = ()2   trJ  + detJ = 0;
where  denotes an eigenvalue. At the e = el steady state, the slope of 	k is larger than
that of 	b : @	k=@k > @	b=@k: Applying (35) and (36), we obtain:
@	k(k)
@k
>
@	b(k)
@k
,M2 
1 + 
(1  )(1  )(1  ) M1 +M2
  (M2)2  
1 + 
(1  )(1  )(1  )  1 > 0
, trJ   detJ   1 > 0
, p(1) = 1  trJ + detJ < 0: (38)
Moreover,
p( 1) = 1 + trJ + detJ
> 1 + (1 + detJ) + detJ
> 0;
where we obtain the second line from trJ > 1+detJ in (38) and the third line from
detJ > 0. Therefore, p(1) < 0 and 0 < p( 1) imply that the e = el steady-state
equilibrium exhibits saddle point stability.
At the e = eh steady state, @	k=@k < @	b=@k holds. Using (35) and (36), we obtain:
@	k(k)
@k
<
@	b(k)
@k
, p(1) = 1  trJ + detJ > 0: (39)
In addition,
p(0) = detJ > 0;
p() =

  trJ
2
2
 

trJ
2
2
+ detJ:
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Therefore, if 0 <trJ < 2; then there are two distinct eigenvalues, 1 and 2, satisfying 1,
2 2 (0; 1):
To show that the condition 0 <trJ < 2 holds, we rst use the condition in (39), which
implies
trJ < 1 + detJ < 2;
where we obtain the second inequality from detJ < 1 in (37). To show trJ > 0; recall
trJ =M 

2

1+
(1  )(1  )(1  )  1 + 2

; which is rewritten as:
trJ =M 

2

1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )(1  )
 

(Xecon   debt(1  ))(1  ) + f(1  )  1g b
k

2| {z }
=1
+2
37775 ;
or
trJ
M2
=

1 + 
(1 debt)(1 )(1 ) (Xecon debt(1 ))(1 ) f(1  )  1g b
k
+1:
Applying the upper limit of Xecon in (31), we can reformulate the above expression as:
trJ
M2
>

1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )(1  )
 
(

1 + 
(1  debt) (1  ) + debt(1  ) +   2


1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )

1=2)
 (1  )
+ debt(1  )(1  ) + f1  (1  )g b
k
+ 1
= (1  )  2


1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )

1=2
+ f1  (1  )g b
k
+ f1  (1  )g
> 0;
indicating that trJ > 0: Therefore, there are two distinct eigenvalues, 1 and 2, with 1,
2 2 (0; 1); implying that the e = eh steady-state equilibrium exhibits a sink.
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A.2 Proof of 1 < 0
Recall the denition of 1 in (34):
1 

(Xecon   debt(1  ))(1  ) + f(1  )  1g b
k

 2:
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Given that 2 > 0; we have
1 < 0, (Xecon   debt(1  ))(1  ) < f1  (1  )g b
k
: (40)
Let denote by b=k a smaller solution of f(b=k) = 0 in (26). (40) indicates that 1 < 0 if
(Xecon   debt(1  ))(1  ) < f1  (1  )g 

b=k

: (41)
Our task is to show that (41) holds under the condition provided in Proposition 2.
Solving f(b=k) = 0; we obtain:
b
k
=
x p(x)2   4  (Xecon   debt(1  ))
2
:
We substitute this solution into (41) and obtain:p
(x)2   4  (Xecon   debt(1  )) < x  2(1  )  (Xecon   debt(1  ))
1  (1  ) : (42)
The right-hand side in (42) is positive if
Xecon <
1  (1  )
1 + (1  ) 


1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )  

+ debt(1  ):
This is satised since the right-hand side in the above expression is greater than the upper
limit of Xecon provided in Proposition 2.
Given that both sides of (42) are positive, (42) is reformulated as follows:
(x)2   4  (Xecon   debt(1  )) < (x)2   2x  2(1  )  (Xecon   debt(1  ))
1  (1  )
+
4()2(1  )2 (Xecon   debt(1  ))2
f1  (1  )g2 ;
or
0 < f1  (1  )g2   x(1  ) f1  (1  )g+ (1  )2 (Xecon   debt(1  )) :
Using the denition of x; we reformulate the above expression as:
debt(1  ) + f1  (1  )g

  1
1   +

1 + 
(1  debt)(1  )

< Xecon: (43)
The left-hand side is less than debt(1 ) because   11  <  1 and 1+ (1  debt)(1 ) 2
(0; 1). This implies that (43) holds if debt(1  )  Xecon : this is the condition for Xecon
provided in Proposition 2. Therefore, 1 < 0 holds under the condition in Proposition 2.

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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) The proof of the rst part is given in the text.
(ii) The utility function for the middle-aged in period-t is:
Ut = ln ct +  ln dt+1 +  lnwt+1ht+1
= ln
1
1 + 
(1  t)wtht +  ln Rt+1
1 + 
(1  t)wtht +  lnwt+1 +  lnD (xt) (ht)1 
= (1 + ) ln(1  t)wtht +  lnRt+1 +  lnwt+1 +  lnxt + (1  ) lnht
+

ln
1
1 + 
+  ln

1 + 
+  lnD

;
where we derive the second line by substituting the consumption and human capital
production functions.
We substitute the prot maximization conditions in (3) into the above expression and
obtain:
Ut = (1+) ln f(1  )A (kt) ht   twthtg+f (  1) + g ln kt+1+ lnxt+(1 ) lnht+C0;
where
C0  ln 1
1 + 
+  ln

1 + 
+  lnD +  lnA+  ln(1  )A:
We rewrite this expression using the expenditure rule in (7), as follows:
Ut = (1 + ) ln f(1  )A (kt) ht   twthtg+ f (  1) + g ln kt+1
+  ln
Xecon
1 + n
A (kt)
 ht + (1  ) lnht + C0: (44)
In the tax-nance case, the government budget constraint is reduced to t = Xecon=(1 
). Plugging this into (44), we obtain:
Ut;tax = (1 + ) ln f(1  ) XecongA (kt) + f (  1) + g ln kt+1 +  ln Xecon
1 + n
A (kt)

+ (1 +  + ) lnht + C0: (45)
In the debt-nance case, the government budget constraint is:
(1 + n)b^t+1 + debt(1  )A (kt) ht = (1 + n)xt + A (kt) 1 b^t;
that is,
(1 + n)bt+1
ht+1
ht
ht + debt(1  )A (kt) ht = XeconA (kt) ht + A (kt) 1 btht:
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We substitute this expression into (44) and obtain:
Ut;debt = (1 + ) ln

(1  )A (kt) ht  XeconA (kt) ht   A (kt) 1 btht + (1 + n)bt+1ht+1
ht
ht

+ f (  1) + g ln kt+1 +  ln Xecon
1 + n
A (kt)
 ht + (1  ) lnht + C0;
that is,
Ut;debt = (1 + ) ln

f(1  ) XecongA (kt) +

 A (kt) 1 bt + (1 + n)bt+1ht+1
ht

+ f (  1) + g ln kt+1 +  ln Xecon
1 + n
A (kt)
 + (1 +  + ) lnht + C0: (46)
In the steady state, k and b are constant. Therefore, by comparing (45) and (46), we
nd that Ut;debt > Ut;tax holds if each term in (46) is larger than the corresponding term
in (45), that is, if the following four conditions hold in the steady state:8>><>>:
 A (kjdebt) 1 + (1 + n)
 
h0
h

debt
  0;
kjdebt > kjtax ;
ht;debt > ht;tax;
 (  1) + ,  > (1 )

:
(47)
To show the rst condition in (47) holds, we rewrite it as:
(1 + n)

h0
h

debt

 A 1
(kjdebt)1 
:
Given that kdebt > k^; the above condition holds if
(1 + n)

h0
h

debt

 A 1
k^
1  ;
that is,
(1 + n) 

D

Xecon
1 + n
A
 1 1 (1 )


A
1 + n
 
1 (1 )
 A  1
A
(1+n)D(Xecon1+n A)

 1 
1 (1 )
:
This expression is rewritten as:
D

Xecon
1 + n
A
 1 1 (1 )


A
1 + n
 
1 (1 )


D

Xecon
1 + n
A
 1 1 (1 )


A
1 + n
 
1 (1 )
;
which holds with an equality. Therefore, the rst condition in (47) is satised in the
steady state.
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The second condition in (47) holds if k^ > kjtax because kjdebt > k^ holds in the steady
state. Given the denition of k^ and ktax in (9), we can reformulate the second condition
in (47) as:"
A
(1 + n)D
 
Xecon
1+n
A

# 1
1 (1 )
>
"

1+
 
1  Xecon
1 

(1  )A
(1 + n)D
 
Xecon
1+n
A

# 1
1 (1 )
;
that is,
Xecon > (1  )  1 + 

:
The third condition in (47) holds if h0=hjdebt > h0=hjtax, i.e., Xecon > (1   )    1+
as shown in the rst part of Proposition 3. Therefore, the steady-state utility in the
debt-nance case is higher than that in the tax-nance case if Xecon > (1   )    1+
and  > (1 )

.

A.4 Proof of Lemma 1
The rst-order conditions with respect to xt and b^t+1 are:
xt :
(1 + )(1 + n)
it   (1 + n)xt + (1 + n)b^t+1
+
f (  1) + g (1 + n)
it   (1 + n)xt   1+n b^t+1
=
( + )(1  )
xt
; (48)
b^t+1 :
(1 + )(1 + n)
it   (1 + n)xt + (1 + n)b^t+1
=
f (  1) + g 1+n

it   (1 + n)xt   1+n b^t+1
: (49)
We substitute (49) into (48), and obtain:
f (  1) + g 1+n

it   (1 + n)xt   1+n b^t+1
+
f (  1) + g (1 + n)
it   (1 + n)xt   1+n b^t+1
=
( + )(1  )
xt
;
or
xt =
( + )(1  )
(1 + n) [f (  1) + g (1 + ) + ( + )(1  )] 
h
it   (1 + n)b^t+1
i
: (50)
We substitute (50) into (49). After rearranging the terms, we obtain the policy func-
tion of b^t+1. We then substitute this into (50) to obtain the policy function of xt.
To obtain the policy function of t, recall the government budget constraint in the
debt-nance case, which is reformulated as (1 + n)b^t+1 + t(1  )A(kt)ht = (1 + n)xt +
A(kt)
 1b^t: Plugging the policy function of xt and b^t+1 into this constraint and using
bt = b^tht; we have:
t(1  )A(kt)ht = (1 + n)X0it + A(kt) 1btht   (1 + n)B0it
= (1 + n)(X0  B0)

(1  )A(kt)ht   A(kt) 1btht
	
+ A(kt)
 1btht
= (1 + n)(X0  B0)(1  )A(kt)ht + f1  (1 + n)(X0  B0)gA(kt) 1btht:
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Dividing both sides by (1  )A(kt)ht, we obtain:
t = (1 + n)(X0  B0) + 
1  f1  (1 + n)(X0  B0)g
bt
kt
:

A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
In the following proof, we rst derive the conditions for which kt+1 > 0; bt+1 > 0, and
t 2 (0; 1) hold along the equilibrium path. Second, we show the existence and uniqueness
of the steady-state equilibrium. Finally, we show that the unique steady-state equilibrium
is a sink.
Step 1.
Recall the capital and debt accumulation equations given by:
kt+1 = 	K 

(1  )A (kt)   A (kt) 1 bt
1 
= 	K 

it
ht
1 
; (51)
bt+1 = 	B 

(1  )A (kt)   A (kt) 1 bt
1 
= 	B 

it
ht
1 
; (52)
respectively. kt+1 > 0 and bt+1 > 0 hold along the equilibrium path if it=ht > 0 for all
t;	K > 0, and 	B > 0:
In period 0; we reformulate the term i0=h0 as:
i0
h0
= (1  )A (k0) 

1  
1   
b0
k0

:
Thus, i0=h0 > 0 holds if
b0
k0
<
1  

: (53)
In period t  1, the term it=ht is rewritten as
it
ht
= (1  )A (kt) 

1  
1   
bt
kt

= (1  )A (kt) 

1  
1   
	B
	K

= (1  )A (kt) 
hn
1  (1 + n)X0   1+n B0
o
  (1 + n)(1+)
(1 )B0
i
1  (1 + n)X0   1+n B0
;
where we obtain the second line using (51) and (52), and the third line using the denition
of 	K and 	B.
The expression above suggests that it=ht > 0 holds for t  1 if the following condition
holds:
B0 > 0 and

1  (1 + n)X0   1 + n

B0

  (1 + n)(1 + )
(1  )B0 > 0: (54)
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In addition, the denitions of 	K and 	B suggest that 	K > 0 and 	B > 0 hold if (54)
holds. After some manipulation, we have:
B0 > 0,  < 

f(1 + ) + (1  )g ; (55)
1  (1 + n)X0   1 + n

B0

  (1 + n)(1 + )
(1  )B0 > 0,


(1 + ) < : (56)
Therefore, kt+1 > 0 and bt+1 > 0 for t  0 if (53), (55), and (56) hold.
Next, consider the tax rate:
t = (1 + n) (X0  B0) + 
1    f1  (1 + n) (X0  B0)g 
bt
kt
;
where
1  (1 + n) (X0  B0) > 0:
Given b0=k0 > 0; 0 > 0 holds if X0  B0 > 0; that is, if
 f(1 + ) + (1  )(1  )g
(1  ) +  < : (57)
For t  1; t > 0 holds if X0  B0 > 0 and bt=kt > 0, that is, if (55), (56), and (57) hold.
To nd the condition for t < 1; let us rst consider the period-0 tax rate. By direct
calculation, we have:
0 < 1, b0
k0
<
1  

, (53).
For period t  1, bt=kt = 	B=	K holds. We thus have:
t < 1, 
1   
	B
	K
< 1, (1 + )

<  , (56):
The results established thus far suggest that kt+1 > 0, bt+1 > 0; and t 2 (0; 1) hold if
(53), (55), (56), and (57) hold, that is, if:
max

 f(1 + ) + (1  )(1  )g
(1  ) +  ;
(1 + )


<  <
 f(1 + ) + (1  )g

;
and
b0
k0
2

0;
1  


:
Step 2.
The steady-state pair of (k; b) satises:
k = 	K 

(1  )A (k)   A (k) 1 b1  ;
b = 	B 

(1  )A (k)   A (k) 1 b1  :
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These equations lead to k=b = 	K=	B, that is, b = (	B=	K)  k: Plugging this into
k = 	K 

(1  )A (k)   A (k) 1 b1 , and rearranging the terms, we obtain a unique
value of k given by:
k =
"
	K 

(1  )A  A	B
	K
1 #1=(1 (1 ))
: (58)
The corresponding value of b is also uniquely determined using b = (	B=	K) k.
Step 3.
Recall the law of motions of capital and debt:
kt+1 = 	K 

(1  )A (kt)   A (kt) 1 bt
1 
;
bt+1 = 	B 

(1  )A (kt)   A (kt) 1 bt
1 
:
Dierentiating these with respect to k and b and evaluating them at the steady state, we
obtain: 
dkt+1
dbt+1

= J

dkt
dbt

;
where
J 

	K  {^(k; b)  (1  )A(k) 2(k + b)  	K  {^(k; b)  A(k) 1
	B  {^(k; b)  (1  )A(k) 2(k + b)  	B  {^(k; b)  A(k) 1

;
and
{^(k; b)  (1  )A(k)   A(k) 1b   (1  ) :
For any (k; b) 0; the trace and determinant of J are
trJ = A(k) 1  {^(k; b)  [(1  )	K   	B] > 0;
detJ = 0:
Here, the sign of the term (1  )	K   	B is
(1  )	K   	B > 0,  > 

(1 + );
where  > 

(1 + ) is satised with the assumption in Proposition 5. Moreover, it is
true that:
  (trJ)2   4detJ = (trJ)2 > 0:
Therefore, J has two distinct positive eigenvalues, denoted by 1 and 2(> 1), at the
steady state.
We obtain the eigenvalues of J by solving the following equation:
p()  ()2   (trJ)+ detJ = 0:
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The solution of p() = 0 is
1 = 0 and 2 = trJ(> 0):
The remaining task is to show 2 < 1: For this purpose, recall the law of motion of cap-
ital in the steady state, k = 	K 

(1  )A (k)   A (k) 1 b1  : This is reformulated
as:
{^(k; b) = (1  )

k
	K
  
1 
: (59)
Using (58) and (59), we rewrite 2 =trJ as follows:
2 = trJ
= A(k) 1(1  )

k
	K
  
1 
[(1  )	K   	B]
= A (	K)
 1
1 
1
(1  )A  A	B
	K
(1  )

1
	K
  
1 
[(1  )	K   	B]
= (1  ) 2 (0; 1);
where the rst line comes from (59) and the second line is derived using (58).

A.6 Proof of Proposition 6.
(i) In both cases, the policy function of x is xt = X0it; where it  f(1  )A(kt)   A(kt) 1ght.
Given that Yt = A(kt)
htNt; we compute the ratio Nt+1xt=Yt as follows:
Nt+1xt
Yt

tax
=
(1 + n)X0

(1  )A (kt)   A (kt) 1 bt
	
ht
A (kt)
 ht
=

(1 + n)X0 f(1  )  b0=k0g for t = 0;
(1 + n)X0(1  ) for t  1;
and
Nt+1xt
Yt

debt
=
(1 + n)X0

(1  )A (kt)   A (kt) 1 bt
	
ht
A (kt)
 ht
= (1 + n)X0 f(1  )  A bt=ktjdebtg ;
where bt > kt holds for any equilibrium path. Therefore, we obtain the rst part of
Proposition 2 and Proposition 6.
(ii) Recall that the tax rates in the tax-nance and debt-nance cases are given by:
tjtax =

(1 + n)X0 + (1  (1 + n)X0) 1  b0k0 for t = 0;
(1 + n)X0 for t  1;
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and
tjdebt =

(1 + n) (X0  B0) + 1   f1  (1 + n) (X0  B0)g  b0k0 for t = 0;
(1 + n) (X0  B0) + 1   f1  (1 + n) (X0  B0)g  	B	K for t  1:
For t = 0; 0jtax and 0jdebt are compared as follows:
0jtax ? 0jdebt ,
b0
k0
7 1  

:
Assuming b0
k0
< 1 

in Proposition 5, we obtain 0jtax > 0jdebt :
For t  1; tjtax and tjdebt are compared as follows:
tjtax ? tjdebt , 1 ?

1   f1  (1 + n) (X0  B0)g
1 + 

n
1  (1 + n)X0   1+n B0
o
, 

1  (1 + n)X0   1 + n

B0

? 
1   (1 + ) f1  (1 + n) (X0  B0)g
,  ?  (1  )

+
(1 + )2
1   ;
where the second line comes from 1   (1 + n)X0   1+n B0 > 0, and the third line comes
from ( + )= 1 > 0, which holds under the assumption in Proposition 5. Therefore,
we obtain the second part of Proposition 6.

A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Recall the policy function of x and the capital accumulation equation in the steady state
presented in Subsection 4.1:
x = X0  (1  )A(k)h;
k = ~	K  f(1  )A(k)g1  :
Combining these equations, we obtain:
x = X0(1  )A

~	K
 
1 (1 ) f(1  )Ag (1 )1 (1 ) h:
Substituting this into h0 = D(x)(h)1  leads to:
h0 = D 

X0(1  )A

~	K
 
1 (1 ) f(1  )Ag (1 )1 (1 ) h

(h)1 ;
or
h0
h

tax
= D 

X0 f(1  )Ag
1
1 (1 )

~	K
 
1 (1 )

: (60)
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Next, recall the set of three equations presented in Subsection 4.2 and evaluate them
at the steady state:
k = 	K 

(1  )A (k)   A (k) 1 b1  ;
b = 	B 

(1  )A (k)   A (k) 1 b1  ;
h0
h
= D (X0)
  (1  )A (k)   A (k) 1 b :
The rst two equations imply
k = (	K)
1
1 (1 )

(1  )A  A	B
	K
 1 
1 (1 )
:
Plugging this into the rst equation, we obtain:

(1  )A (k)   A (k) 1 b1  = (	K) (1 )1 (1 ) (1  )A  A	B
	K
 1 
1 (1 )
;
or 
(1  )A (k)   A (k) 1 b = (	K) 1 (1 ) (1  )A  A	B
	K
 
1 (1 )
:
We substitute this into the third equation and obtain:
h0
h

debt
= D (X0)
 (	K)

1 (1 )

(1  )A  A	B
	K
 
1 (1 )
: (61)
A direct comparison of (60) and (61) leads to:
h0
h

tax
? h
0
h

debt
,

~	K

(1  )A ? (	K)

(1  )A  A	B
	K

,


1 + 
 1  (1 + n)X0
(1 + n)D (X0)


(1  )A
?
"

1 + 
 1  (1 + n)X0  
1+n

B0
(1 + n)D (X0)

# 
(1  )A  A	B
	K

, [1  (1 + n)X0] (1  )A ?

1  (1 + n)X0   1 + n

B0
 
(1  )A  A	B
	K

;
where we obtain the second line from the denitions of ~	K and 	K .
Given that B0 > 0 and X0 > 0, we have:
1  (1 + n)X0 > 1  (1 + n)X0   1 + n

B0;
(1  )A > (1  )A  A	B
	K
:
Therefore, we nd that h
0
h

tax
> h
0
h

debt
.

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A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Recall the indirect utility function of the middle-aged in the tax-nance case, (20), and
that in the debt-nance case, (23). Substituting the corresponding policy functions leads
to:
Vtax;t = f1 + ( + )( + (1  ))g ln

(1  )A(kt)   A(kt) 1bt
	
+ (1  )( + )(1  ) lnht + f1 + ( + )g ln (1  (1 + n)X0)
+ ( + )(1  ) lnX0 + C1;
Vdebt,t = f1 + ( + )( + (1  ))g ln

(1  )A(kt)   A(kt) 1bt
	
+ (1  )( + )(1  ) lnht + (1 + ) ln [1  (1 + n)X0 + (1 + n)B0]
+ f(  1) + g ln

1  (1 + n)X0   1 + n

B0

+ ( + )(1  ) lnX0 + C1;
where kt; bt; and ht are given.
By comparing Vtax;t and Vdebt,t, we obtain:
Vtax;t ? Vdebt,t , 1 ?

1  (1 + n)X0 + (1 + n)B0
1  (1 + n)X0
1+

"
1  (1 + n)X0   1+n B0
1  (1 + n)X0
#( 1)+
, 1 ?
"
(1 + )2
1 + ( + )
#1+

24(1 + )
n
+

  1
o
1 + ( + )
35( 1)+ :
Dene  ()  ( + ). Then, we have:
Vtax;t ? Vdebt,t , 1 ? f () 
"
(1 + )2
1 + 
#1+

24(1 + )



  1

1 + 
35  ;
where the upper limit of ; denoted by ; is:
  j
=
f(1+)+(1 )g

= (2 + );
and f
 


= 1 holds. Therefore, Vtax;t < Vdebt,t holds if f
0() < 0:
To show f 0() < 0; we take the logarithm of f :
ln f() = (1 + ) ln (1 + )
2
1 + 
+ (   ) ln
(1 + )



  1

1 + 
= f2 (1 + ) + (   )g ln (1 + ) + (   ) ln



  1

  (1 + ) ln (1 + ) :
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Dierentiating ln f() with respect to  yields:
@ ln f()
@
= ln
(1 + )



  1

1 + 
= ln
(1 + )

1

  1


1

+ 1
;
showing that @ ln f()=@ is increasing in :
Given that  <   (2+); @ ln f()=@ < 0 holds if @ ln f()=@  0 at  = : Direct
calculation results in:
@ ln f()
@

=
= ln 1 = 0:
Therefore, we obtain @ ln f()=@ < 0 for  <  and thus Vtax;t < Vdebt,t for given kt; bt;
and ht:

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Figure 1: Numerical example of the phase diagram for the planner system, (12) and (13).
The parameters values are set at  = 0:3;  = (0:997)30;  = 0:154; n = (1:006)30  1; A =
1; D = 3:347; debt = 0:076; Xecon = 0:05323. The values of ; ; A;D; and n follow
those in Lancia and Russo (2015). The value of Xecon is based on the average pub-
lic education expenditure-GDP ratios in OECD countries in 2011 (OECD, education
database: https://data.oecd.org/eduresource/public-spending-on-education.htm, Decem-
ber 28, 2015). The value of debt is set to satisfy the condition in Proposition 2.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Numerical example of the evolution of the aggregate expenditure-GDP ratio
(Panel (a)) and the tax rate (Panel (b)) for the tax-nance and the debt cases from period
0. The value of  is set at  = 5:5; and other parameter values follow those in Figure 1.
The initial conditions are k0 = 0:005; h0 = 0:005; and b0 = 0:0001. All values apply in the
following examples.
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Figure 3: Numerical example of the evolution of the growth rate for the tax-nance and
the debt-nance cases.
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Figure 4: Numerical example of the evolution of utility for the tax-nance and the debt-
nance cases.
44
Table 1: Summary: Numerical results from period 0 to period 2.
Tax-nance case Debt-nance case
Period-0 utility -48.1277 -48.0236
Period-1 utility -41.7432 -43.3488
Period-2 utility -36.1135 -38.6928
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